That giant slurping sound on Friday was Silicon Valley Bank imploding. America’s 16th-largest bank had some $175 billion in deposits and disappeared by breakfast. It wouldn’t have happened if not for management mistakes. This was a 21st-century bank run—customers tried to withdraw about $42 billion, a quarter of all deposits. But what triggered the collapse?
Let’s go back. In January 2020, SVB had $55 billion in customer deposits on its balance sheet. By the end of 2022, that number exploded to $186 billion. Yes, SVB was a victim of its own success. These deposits were often from initial public offerings and SPAC deals—SVB banked almost half of all IPO proceeds in the last two years. Most startups had relationships with the bank.
That’s a lot of money to put to work. Some was lent out, but with soaring stock prices and near-zero interest rates, no one needed to take on excessive debt. There was no way SVB was going to initiate $131 billion in new loans. So the bank put some of this new capital into higher-yielding long-term government bonds and $80 billion into 10-year mortgage-backed securities paying 1.5% instead of short-term Treasurys paying 0.25%.
This was mistake No. 1. SVB reached for yield, just as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers did in the 2000s. With few loans, these investments were the bank’s profit center. SVB got caught with its pants down as interest rates went up.
Everyone, except SVB management it seems, knew interest rates were heading up. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell has been shouting this from the mountain tops. Yet SVB froze and kept business as usual, borrowing short-term from depositors and lending long-term, without any interest-rate hedging.
The bear market started in January 2022, 14 months ago. Surely it shouldn’t have taken more than a year for management at SVB to figure out that credit would tighten and the IPO market would dry up.
